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ABSTRACT 
Researchers in the field of empirical phenomenology often base their understanding on the theories of 
philosophical phenomenology, particularly favouring Husserl in their discussions and explaining 
obtained results in terms of pre-reflective and reflective experience. In this article we first outline 
various authors’ intuitions on the phenomenological tradition, before going on to examine certain 
assumptions of the empirical phenomenological tradition. In the second part we present preliminary 
results of our empirical phenomenological research in the attempt to point to the enormous 
phenomenological richness of pre-reflective awareness. To an extent we attempt to contribute to the 
understanding of the techniques of modern empirical phenomenological research by discussing the 
presuppositions of its relevant authors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. 
It is the theory which decides what can be observed. 
Albert Einstein 
In the discussion about the possibilities of first-person research, Froese, Gould and Seth [1] 
distinguish between two conceptions of consciousness1, referring to them as shallow and 
deep. They say that in some research traditions (such as the higher-order thought theories of 
consciousness; e. g. Rosenthal [2]), the term conscious refers to phenomena that have been 
directly experienced by a subject and can also be reported verbally (reflective phenomena), 
“while everything else is referred to as unconscious” [1; p.51]. They refer to this 
conceptualisation of consciousness as a shallow view. 
In contrast, the deep conceptualisations of consciousness are much more inclusive. They 
contain the phenomena falling into the shallow conception (experiences which are 
reflectively lived through and thus can be verbally articulated) as well as pre-reflective2 
experiences, which are “experiences that are lived but without the person being focally or 
thematically aware of them” [1; p.52]. Pre-reflective experiences can be reflected on and 
become reflected experiences. The deep conception of consciousness looks on the 
phenomena of interest to the shallow conception as merely a particular way of experiencing: 
an explicit awareness of lived experience. 
Researchers in the field of empirical phenomenology (e.g. [3, 4]), often base their 
understanding of experience on theories of philosophical phenomenology, which usually 
employ a deep conceptualisation of consciousness (in the sense that pre-reflective experience 
can be reflected). For this reason, we begin by turning towards some of the basic assumptions 
and intuitions of the phenomenological lineage. We start with William James, then delve into 
phenomenological philosophy, where we will briefly consider the views of Edmund Husserl 
and Jean-Paul Sartre. Following that, our main focus will be on empirical phenomenological 
researchers and their presuppositions about experience and the pre-reflective dimension of 
consciousness. Lastly, we turn to an illustration of one such phenomenon which resides on 
the fringe of awareness. 
This article is not a comprehensive examination of the above mentioned points, but solely a 
preliminary outline with the aim to further inspire considerations and research in this direction. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LINEAGE 
According to William James [5], consciousness consists of more than the experiences we are 
currently focusing on. Every conscious experience also has various transitional experiences 
on the fringe of awareness, which he characterizes as having a fleeting or transient quality. 
James describes these experiences on the fringe as vague feelings of context which is 
consciously experienced and important for the content we are attending at a given moment. 
Nonetheless, it is not an experience that can be consciously available [5]. 
Similarly, Edmund Husserl [6] argues that every experience is initially lived through and is 
not an object of consciousness. Thus, according to Husserl, the consciousness that is present 
at the moment we experience something must not be understood in terms of reflection or 
introspection. Rather, an act of reflection is the direction of attention towards something that 
has already been experienced without being taken into view: “When I say ‘I,’ I grasp myself 
in a simple reflection. But this self-experience [Selbsterfahrung] is like every experience 
[Erfahrung], and in particular every perception, a mere directing myself towards something 
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that was already there for me, that was already conscious, but not thematically experienced, 
not noticed.” ([7], quoting [8; pp.492-493]). 
Our everyday experiences are always available to us, always conscious (pre-reflective or 
reflective). Only by the act of turning towards (the act of reflection) something that has 
already been there for us, we come to perceive and know its subject matter. This reflective 
experience is by itself a new type of experience, or as Husserl puts it, the reflective experience 
“is not merely added to the previous life, to the respective experience or experiential thinking, 
rather it transforms it in a specific manner” ([9; p.184], quoting [10; p.89]). 
In line with the aforementioned deep conceptualisation of consciousness, Jean-Paul Sartre [11] 
divides consciousness into reflective and pre-reflective, stressing that any consciousness of 
something is always pre-reflective, and that pre-reflective consciousness is a necessary 
precondition for reflective consciousness. Sartre’s division is also widely used in modern 
phenomenological philosophy, especially in the works of Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi [7]. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
Pierre Vermersch distinguishes between three dimensions of consciousness: an active 
unconscious mode3, a lived (pre-reflective) consciousness and a reflective consciousness 
mode of lived experience [3]. He suggests that becoming reflectively aware of an experience 
requires a “transition from a pre-reflective consciousness of the lived experience to a 
reflective consciousness of the same lived experience” [3; p.13]. This transition is the activity 
of reflection, which “enables the perception of lived experiences, and particularly of lived 
experiences which were not ‘viewed’ and which can [be] viewed after the fact” [3, p.16]. 
In his view, experiences we are not aware of at a particular moment always continue to be 
available. These lived experiences inhabit the mode of non-reflective consciousness and 
retain the possibility of being reflected upon. In Vermersch’s own words “I am fully 
conscious of it without at the same time being conscious of the way in which I do it. I 
perceive or I do x, without necessarily keeping in the view of my consciousness the way in 
which I organise my perceptive activity” [3; p.17]. Such lived experiences can be awakened 
using different introspective techniques, such as the elicitation interview. This interview 
method helps the trained practitioner to become aware of her lived subjective experience, 
leading to accurate and careful articulation. 
Complementary considerations can also be found in the works of Claire Petitmengin and 
Michel Bitbol [12], who propose that we are not aware of most of our current lived 
experience, because, in the process of experiencing, our attention is very narrowly focused 
and fast changing the focus from one relevant object to another. They explain that a lot of 
experienced content is left aside, but this content nevertheless remains in the background in 
the form of a passive memory. Referring to Vermersch [13], who says that the content we are 
not aware of (pre-reflective experience) can be retrospectively accessed during elicitation 
interviews, they claim that pre-reflective experience is important for our understanding of 
reflection, emphasizing that they understand reflection not as a signifier of a conscious 
perception of a previously unconscious event, but rather a renewal of contact with 
experience, an experiencing and a redirection of attention. 
EMPIRICAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE EXPLORATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 
The elicitation interview4 is in line with the phenomenological work of Husserl. It is a 
technique used for the examination of conscious experience, particularly for becoming aware of 
pre-reflective experiences, which are considered to be hidden on the fringe of awareness [4]. 
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In the process of carrying out the elicitation interview, the trained researcher guides the 
attention of the interviewee and extends her focus from the explicitly reflective, to the 
implicit, pre-reflective dimension of experience. The goal of this type of interview is to “help 
subjects redirect their attention from the content of the experience towards the mode and 
dynamics of appearance of this content, and to describe it precisely” [14; p.30]. 
To achieve this, an evocation of experience is required, enabling contact with the experience. 
The moment set forth to examine in the interview is evoked when the interviewee’s “past 
situation becomes more present for her than the present situation is” [14; p.30]. This process of 
evocation of experience is described as “the capacity of the subjects to enrich progressively 
their exploration and their description of experience, each re-enactment calling forth new 
elements and generating new descriptemes” [15; p.276]. 
What is intriguing in this approach is that this method enables the examination of both 
currently present and long past, forgotten experiences. Froese, Gould and Barrett [16] 
summarize the assumptions of this claim, saying that a shift in attention enables some parts of a 
previously pre-reflective experience to enter consciousness. By recalling this past experience, 
the elicitation interview technique helps evoke the just past pre-reflective experience in the 
present experience. Whereas the claim that a long past pre-reflective experience could be re-
lived and made into a present experience is in their view more controversial. 
But does the accessibility of the pre-reflective dimension of experience apply to all kinds of 
experience? Can any type of experiencing become reflective and therefore available to verbal 
report? 
It is our view that the retrospective intervention of taking into view a chosen part of 
experience does something significantly different in certain types of phenomena. These are the 
phenomena that normally reside on the fringe of awareness and cannot be transformed from the 
pre-reflective to reflective conscious experience. This would be contrary to the presuppositions 
of the elicitation interview, that it is possible to observe any present or past experience by a 
(guided) shift and expansion of attention. In the following chapter, we demonstrate some 
aspects of such an elusive phenomenological quality with the help of an example. 
THE EXPERIENTIAL ASPECT: AN EXAMPLE OF GIST 
Some examples of experiential dynamics that change when reflected on are the sense of 
agency [17], existential feelings [18] and the experience of gist [19]. Kordeš and Demšar [20] 
define gist as the feeling that we have knowledge of a particular thing/concept available or 
the feeling of an essence of the answer that follows the question, but this answer is not yet 
clearly defined in consciousness. If we try to reflect upon gist, it changes, expanding into 
content. The original, pre-reflective feeling (i.e. gist) is thereby replaced by another 
phenomenological quality altogether. Furthermore, Kordeš and Demšar [20] compare the 
experience of gist with descriptions of Tichener’s analyses related to imageless thought, the 
“vague and elusive processes, which carry as if in a nutshell the entire meaning of a 
situation” ([20], quoting [21, p.188]). 
Below we present an excerpt from an interview, where the co-researcher5 reports his feeling 
of gist unfolding into content throughout the process of the interview. In this part of the 
interview, the co-researcher was attempts to remember the names of the seven characters 
from a book, but has difficulty naming the seventh character. During the interview, the 
researcher (R) guides and facilitates the opening of space for the co-researchers’ (CO-R) 
observation of his experience. 
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CO-R: The visual presentation has disappeared in between. 
R: But the content was still there? 
CO-R: Yes. But I could not, for example, look and see under each number 
each specific character. 
R: You said you knew what he was like. You knew his characteristics. In what 
way? 
CO-R: As if I was once again playing a movie of these scenes, at the time they 
were all there. And then there was a scene, when he was gone.  
R: So you were looking for something? In a way, you went back trying to 
remember scenes from a movie. Well, try to recall this visual part of your 
experiencing, what do you remember here? 
CO-R: Most of all, I remember that he had a big hammer. 
R: But how did the knowledge that he is the bastard son of the previous king 
come to you? 
CO-R: His hammer, a face, a place he was in, his face again... and with this 
the whole story about what happened to him before manifests. As in one 
package, as a whole package, as if this just opens ... 
R: Yes, how? Try to remember. You were browsing through the scenes... 
CO-R: It was not quite a visual scene, but somehow from the ideas, 
approximations of the scene ... somehow it became visible out of this space, 
the hammer kind of shone through. 
R: What do you mean by “approximations of the scene”? 
CO-R: That it was not a clear reconstruction, but just an outline of someone 
with a huge hammer. 
R: So there was something visual? Would it be possible that this was just 
knowledge? Was there knowledge of who is already in the package? But only 
this new one with the hammer was visual? 
CO-R: Yes, yes. 
R: So, here we have gist, that past knowing was the gist, but when you went 
back, if you thought of someone else, he would again show himself visually. 
So, somehow you looked at these scenes, found this hammer and when you 
saw the hammer, you already knew who it was? 
CO-R: Yes. Then I got the face and with this face it went into almost like 
approximations of scenes and through this the story where he was.  
R: All the places where this bastard son has been? 
CO-R: I mean, there were a lot of different scenes and a lot of different 
places. And it happened all at once.  
R: Let us look at this. So, you suddenly and all at once feel a lot of 
information, memories of the events. 
CO-R: Although, there is more of a felt potentiality of these memories and 
information. I know that they are there to be able to look at and if I looked at 
them they would develop into something more.  
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R: So that is gist. What you have just described is a typical gist. So, some kind 
of a felt potentiality of these scenes and you only looked at things which were 
relevant for what you needed? 
CO-R: I mean, gist was only the result of seeing someone with a hammer and 
then it all came. 
R: Yes, the gist of who he is. 
CO-R: Yes. 
R: Right. Well, my question is ... was the knowledge that he’s the bastard son 
of the king already there at that time, or did you call it out/probe it out here 
and now? But the question is what was recalled then and what was in the felt 
potentiality then. If you remember? I am aware that this is very hard to 
remember ... 
CO-R: Yes, I don’t think it was recalled then ... it was mostly just some ... the 
visual image was recalled, but the rest of it was just something I vaguely knew 
about.  
R: You cannot remember that any of these … So you saw the hammer ... can 
you remember if any of his characteristics have been articulated in the 
moment when you also put him in your package? 
CO-R: No, it was only visual. 
R: Okay. Now try to remember that feeling of gist. The feeling of that, I am 
going to say cloud, where there were many packets of these events associated 
with him. Can you remember this feeling? 
CO-R: No, because now when I try to remember, I open … it only opens this 
package and there are only scenes there. 
R: So you have already been doing this before, just that before you did not 
know how to describe this feeling? So you kept opening it and said it was at 
the castle and he did that and so on? 
CO-R: Yes, yes. 
During the interview, the co-researcher attempts to probe and describe his feeling of gist 
many times, which leads to content creation and the explication of the experience of gist. 
This example shows that the attempt to reflect the gist, transforms it into content – the 
primary, pre-reflective experience of gist is transformed into a different phenomenological 
quality. The co-researcher compares the experience of gist of the answer to the felt 
potentiality of a certain kind of content (i.e. the answer to the question, or rather the task he 
has set for himself), which he feels resides in a certain kind of area, which is not entirely clear 
and can be clarified by more probing. In his own words: “although, there is more of a felt 
potentiality of these memories and information. I know that they are there to be able to look 
at and if I looked at them they would develop into something more”. 
The co-researcher observes the possibility of being able to look at a certain kind of area of 
consciousness more sharply; he notices the ability to sharpen and clarify a chosen part of 
experience, which he feels is holding the answer. But his inquiring into this felt space does 
not show him anything more of it. The felt space rather moulds itself into content and visual 
presentations. Reflection “opens this package”, the experience changes and illustrates itself as 
it becomes the focus of reflective attention. 
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CONCLUSION 
Gist presents a problem for the idea that it is possible to reflect upon any type of 
pre reflective experience. It indicates that the transition from pre-reflective to reflective 
consciousness significantly changes certain phenomena. In other words, the reflection of a 
particular lived experience does not enable the perception of a pre-reflective consciousness of 
the same experience, but rather creates an entirely new experience. 
So what does this tell us about consciousness and the pre-reflective experience empirical 
phenomenology is set out to explore? And more importantly, how do we study these 
experiences on the periphery of our awareness? 
One hint to help us think in this direction could be found in quantum mechanics. It is our 
intuition that empirical phenomenology employs a similar hermeneutic to that found in some 
other sciences, particularly physics, where research results themselves pose doubt and put the 
presuppositions of the research method, on which they have been obtained, into question. 
Further deliberation on these phenomena will in part challenge us to think outside the box 
and go beyond the theories we have been using in order to better understand consciousness 
and the world of experience. 
The theories and presuppositions of the elicitation interview we rely on determine and create 
what we later observe and interpret, but studying phenomena which dwell on the periphery of 
awareness put the assumptions we build upon into question, calling for a re-evaluation of our 
understanding and techniques. 
REMARKS 
1Throughout this article we use the terms consciousness, awareness and self-consciousness 
1interchangeably. 
2The concept of pre-reflective self-consciousness originally comes from the work of 
2Jean-Paul Sartre [11]. The more recent interpretation that reflective self-consciousness is 
2dependent on a more fundamental, primary consciousness is often used in current 
2phenomenological thought. Similar understanding of the notion of reflective consciousness 
2can also be found in leading phenomenological figures such as Heidegger and 
2Merleau-Ponty (for more details see [22]). 
3He describes this mode of consciousness as a phenomenological unconscious, pointing out 
3that it should not be confused or equated with unconsciousness as the description of 
3processes not being available to introspective report. The existence of the active unconscious 
3mode “does not presuppose a censorship mechanism, which could be termed the ‘normal’ or 
3‘usual’ unconscious, and which can only be studied by inference through a third-person 
3viewpoint” [3; p.15]. 
4At first the term entretiend’explicitation was translated into English as explicitation 
4interview, which was several years later changed to elicitation interview. More recently, the 
4word microphenomenology is employed by Claire Petitmengin to denote the same method of 
4empirical phenomenological research of helping people became aware of the hidden, 
4implicit parts of experience. 
5In our research we use the term co-researcher to denote a participant who is genuinely 
5interested in the research question and the study of his or her own experience to such an 
5extent that the research question becomes their own research question [23]. 
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